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Blocking Laws and Secrecy Provisions: Do
International Negotiations Concerning Insider




When is a crime not a crime? When the investigations and/or
prosecution are stymied by jurisdictional conflicts which bar the
production of evidence or the prosecution of the crime itself. Con-
flicts of this type are becoming more and more common. The
growth in international securities trading' exemplifies the opportu-
nities for conflict between the United States and foreign jurisdic-
tions. The conflict is especially apparent in the application of Rule
1Ob-5, the "antifraud rule."2
The courts have defined trading on inside information (private
information intended to be available only for corporate purposes)
as a fraud upon the other purchasers of the same stock who buy
and sell without this valuable information. To protect those who
trade on its securities markets, the United States has enacted stiff
penalties for insider trading. The millions of dollars of profits to
* J.D. Hamline University School of Law; M.A., B.A. Northern Illinois University.
1. Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, Hearings Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 319 (1983) (increase from $25.6 billion in 1971 to $99.2 billion
in 1982, cited from a Treasury Bulletin, Winter Issue 1984 at 106-09, in prepared state-
ment of J. Fedders) [hereinafter Crime and Secrecy Hearings]; Fedders, Wade, Mann &
Beizer, Waiver by Conduct-A Possible Response to the Internationalization of the Secur-
ities Market, J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. 1, 2 (1984).
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] promulgated Rule
X-10b-5, later designated Rule lOb-5, in 1942. Rule lOb-5 follows the language of section
17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and is under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Rule lOb-5
provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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be made from insider trading continue to tempt insiders.3 Insiders
still search for ways to avoid the discovery and prosecution of
their "insider" securities transactions.
One method of avoidance involves routing the transaction
through a foreign financial institution in a jurisdiction that does
not consider insider trading a crime.4 Foreign jurisdictions not
only do not define the use of inside information as fraud; some
may even consider the use of inside information in trading as a
perquisite of being privy to such information. Besides having dif-
fering definitions of criminality, many foreign jurisdictions have
other public policies concerning the protection of confidential in-
formation which are reflected in their substantive and procedural
laws. Typically, the foreign institutions involved in insider trading
are offshore banks,5 but that is not always the case. The discrep-
ancies between the regulations in the United States and foreignjurisdictions tend to create a type of "safe harbor" for insider-
traders.
For example, a foreign jurisdiction may provide secrecy provi-
sions which prevent a bank from disclosing the beneficial owner of
any account, including trading accounts.' Secrecy provisions im-
pose a duty of confidentiality on the banker-client relationship. 7
3. One of the biggest insider scandals concerned Ivan Boesky, who was recently
forced to disgorge fifty million dollars in profits made from insider trading. See The Secret
World of Ivan Boesky, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1986, 50, at 51 [hereinafter Ivan Boesky].
4. For the United Kingdom view on regulating insider trading see Loss, Multina-
tional Approaches: Corporate Insiders, ch. 12 (Loss ed. 1976) [hereinafter Loss]; for
France, see id. ch. 13; for Germany, see id. ch. 14.
5. The term offshore bank or offshore financial haven refers to a company practicing
international banking which is kept separate, in most jurisdictions, from local banking and
business. The separation from the local banking and business of the haven country is neces-
sary because the regulations governing the offshore haven differ from those which govern
the local institutions. This separate regulation, or rather lack of regulation, allows the off-
shore bank to provide its clientele with a veil of secrecy. The havens' laws authorize num-
bered bank accounts and nominal corporations. The beneficial owners are shielded by the
secrecy provisions which provide criminal sanctions and civil liabilities which are exercised
against those bankers and institutions which reveal any information about the owners. The
offshore banks may be split into two groups; the legitimate banks, generally a branch office
of a major commercial bank, and shell banks or corporations which may only exist on
paper or consist of an office with a mailing address, a telephone, and a "bank officer" to
answer it. R. BLUM, OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS, AND COMPANIES: THE BUSINESS OF
CRIME IN THE EUROMARKET (1984) [hereinafter R. BLUM].
6. For a listing of nations with secrecy provisions (generally "tax havens") see Staff
of Senate Committee of Government Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., Crime and Secrecy:
The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, 10 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter Staff
Study]. See also M. Langer, Practical International Tax Planning, 309-21 (1979); E.
Chambost, Bank Accounts: A World Guide to Confidentiality, 3 (Walton & Thompson,
trans. 1983).
7. Switzerland's secrecy laws are probably the best known example of the legislation
concerning the relationship between the banker and the customer. Any communication
with the customer is within the confidentiality, and only the customer can waive the secrecy
laws.
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Banker-client confidentiality is protected by criminal and civil
sanctions which may be imposed on bankers who disclose informa-
tion about a client or an account.' Insider traders trade through
accounts in banks whose personnel is subject to secrecy provisions.
In addition to differing standards of criminality and secrecy
provisions, some foreign jurisdictions provide a third layer of pro-
tection in disclosure blocking laws. These laws block or limit the
release of information in the absence of secrecy provisions, or in
the unlikely event that the secrecy provisions were overcome.9
Blocking laws may be divided into two major categories: (1) laws
that prohibit the disclosure of any information that relates to spe-
cific subject matters and (2) laws that condition disclosure on
compliance with the terms of a multi-national treaty,10 a specific
international agreement,11 or the discovery procedure as mandated
by the courts or legislatures of the foreign jurisdiction.12
This second category of legislation and/or common law pre-
vents the disclosure of confidential information under two separate
public policy considerations. One policy consideration involves the
8. See Swiss Federal Law, art. 47(1), reprinted in Staff Study, at 230 (maximum
fine of 50,000 Swiss francs or a prison term not exceeding 6 month for intentional disclos-
ure); id. art. 47(2) (30,000 Swiss francs for negligent disclosure).
9. CANADA: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Statutes of Canada 1984-85,
C.49 allows the Attorney General of Canada to seize records and otherwise prohibit dis-
closure when:
a foreign state or a foreign tribunal has taken or is proposing or is likely to take
measures affecting international trade or commerce of a kind or in a manner that
has adversely affected or is likely to adversely affect significant Canadian interests
in relation to international trade or commerce involving business carried on in
whole or in part in Canada, or that otherwise has infringed or is likely to infringe
Canadian sovereignty...
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act § 5(1).
UNITED KINGDOM: Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, 1980, Ch. 11 prevents
courts from complying with foreign orders:
(a) if it infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudi-
cial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom: or
(b) If compliance with the requirement would be prejudicial to the security of the
United Kingdom or to the relations of the government of the United Kingdom
with the government of any other country.
FRANCE: Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980 has similar language.
10. For example, the (Hague) Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. no. 7444 (1972) appears in 7
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4509 (1980) with a listing of signatory nations
and their reservations, and is discussed infra note 42 and accompanying text.
11. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T.R. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (January 23, 1977) [hereinafter Treaty
on Mutual Assistance]; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Republic of the
Netherlands and the United States, June 12, 1981, T.I.A.S. 10734; Treaty with the Repub-
lic of Turkey on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979,
T.I.A.S. 9891; similar treaties in criminal matters with Columbia, Italy, Morocco, and
Canada.
12. See supra note 9.
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concept of sovereign immunity' 3-- the right of a state to rule it-
self-which includes the regulation of its securities markets, its
substantive law concerning confidential relationships, and its pro-
cedural rulings concerning discovery. Another public policy con-
cern involves the foreign state's underlying rationales for its deci-
sion regarding the parameters of disclosures allowed within the
foreign court systems.
The problems in investigating and prosecuting cases that cross
jurisdictional lines involve both the claiming of jurisdiction and
the possible challenge caused by secrecy provisions and disclosure
blocking laws. A current trend in cases brought under Rule 10b-5
shows a decrease in the amount of contact with the United States
considered necessary to claim jurisdiction. Current attempts by
United States courts to claim jurisdiction over predominantly for-
eign cases may be exacerbating, rather than easing, the problems
inherent in getting information and evidence from a foreign juris-
diction. In addition, foreign states have already shown a tendency
to enact even more protective blocking legislation in response to
demands for the disclosure of information.
Even though negotiation with foreign jurisdictions is a proven
method of gaining needed cooperation, especially in the area of
securities, United States courts are currently developing a policy
of aggressively demanding compliance with discovery requests. In
response, foreign states protect their interests by enacting laws
which force the United States courts to submit their demands for
disclosure through the foreign courts, thus subjecting these re-
quests to the substantive laws and the procedural rules of the for-
eign nation.
I. FOREIGN STATES' INTEREST IN PROTECTING JURISDICTION
Foreign states pursue differing national objectives through di-
verse national methods. 4 Every nation is a sovereign power and
exercises its morals and, self-interest through its own institutions.
No absolute standard, or even an agreed-upon standard, for judg-
ing criminality exists in international law. 5 Nations have differing
standards of criminality.16 When one nation's standards are mea-
sured against those of another, discrepancies become apparent.
These discrepancies may create a zone of political immunity, a
13. See supra note 9.
14. Symposia, Transnational Litigation, Part II, Perspectives from the Untied
States and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 773 (1984) [hereinafter Transnational Perspectives].
15. See generally A TREATY ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, (M. Bassiouni &
V. Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
16. See generally note 15.
[Vol. 26
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criminal sanctuary, or a financial haven.17 No nation may assume
its legal system will be viewed sympathetically by any other. A
nation's intent to exploit a competitive advantage over another
may not necessarily be judged immoral even by a rigorous stan-
dard.18 A nation has the right to regulate the banks and corpora-
tions within its jurisdiction as much or as little as it sees fit.19
A nation may choose to purposefully legislate a legal climate
that will allow businesses to: (1) avoid restrictive legislation, (2)
to profit from higher interest rates when lending, (3) to avoid tax-
ation, (3) to take advantage of lower interest rates when borrow-
ing, (4) to protect confidential activities which, if known to others,
would jeopardize the chances of success or lessen the profit mar-
gin, and (5) to take advantage of opportunities to hedge business
risks through off-shore diversity liquidity and forward
speculation.2 °
A guarantee of banking secrecy2l reinforces a protective busi-
ness climate. Other legitimate reasons for the secrecy provisions
exist. Individuals may justify the use of bank secrecy laws for five
reasons: 1) capital flight from political, religious and racial perse-
cution;"2 2) freedom from oppressive government confiscatory
taxes, and the risks of war;23 3) freedom from unwanted popular-
ity and threats to one's reputation;2 4 4) protection from legal judg-
ments;25 and 5) protection from the increasing domestic threat of
robbery, fraud or swindles. 6
In order to keep this legislated protection firmly in place, for-
eign jurisdictions are enacting and reinforcing blocking provisions
which channel discovery orders through the foreign judicial
system.
17. See R. BLUM, supra note 5, ch. 2.
18. Switzerland's secrecy laws developed to protect fleeing Jewish capital from the
Nazi government, the legitimate government at the time.
19. Foreign nations perceive the aggressive claims of jurisdiction and demands for
disclosure from the United States as attempts to impose the United States' policy decisions
and legal standards on the world through extraterritorial application of United States laws.
See Widmer, The United States Securities Laws: Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to
Messrs. Lomiss & Grant), 1 J. CoMP. CORP. & SEC. REG. 39 (1978).
20. Staff Study, supra note 6, at 44.
21. The guarantee of secrecy is enforceable in common law. The recent trend in
many jurisdictions with common law secrecy provisions is to codify them. Crime and Se-
crecy Hearings, supra note 1, at 181. Other jurisdictions allow a civil suit for damages
under tort law for violation of secrecy provision. Id. at 177-245.
22. SKOUSEN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY 3-4 (4th ed. 1983).
23. Id. at 4-10.
24. Id. at 11-13.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 13-14.
1989]
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A. Example: The Cayman Islands
The Cayman Islands secrecy provisions subject bankers to both
civil and criminal penalties for breach of confidentiality. In In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field,27 Field was a Ca-
nadian citizen and resident of the Cayman Islands, where he was
a banker. A subpoena was served on him at a Miami airport. He
refused to answer questions concerning his clients which he felt
violated the secrecy provisions of the Cayman Islands.28
The ultimate result of the decision to claim jurisdiction in the
Field case was the enactment by the Cayman Islands of further
blocking legislation which provided even broader protection for
clients and stiffer penalties for bankers. 29 As an added protection,
this legislation provided for disclosure of confidential information
through the Cayman Islands judicial system. The judge may di-
rect that the information be given, withheld, or be given subject to
conditions which safeguard confidentiality.30
II. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE AREA OF INSIDER TRADING
The area of securities regulation poses even more specific
problems. For example, the substantive law in European nations
regulating securities markets31 differs greatly in substance from
that of the United States. These differences are especially appar-
ent in regulations concerning insider trading, because of the dif-
ferent national attitudes toward insider trading.
In Cady, Roberts & Co. v. SEC, 2 the Securities and Exchange
Commission imposed sanctions for trading on "information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone."33 The SEC held that the integrity of
the United States securities markets was in jeopardy from "the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such [inside] information knowing it is unavailable to those with
27. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). For an in-depth
analysis of the legal issues presented by Field, see Note, Federal Judicial Compulsion of
an Alien's Testimony Contrary to the Mandate of the Laws of His Native Land, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (1977).
28. Staff Study, supra note 6, at 230.
29. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of 1976), published in
Cayman Islands Gazette No. 20 (1976).
30. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th
Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S. Ct. 778 (1985) for a case in which the
government eventually waived the secrecy laws and provided the information requested.
31. See generally Loss, supra note 4.
32. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See also Dann & Phil-
lips, The Implication of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939 (1962).
33. 40 S.E.C. at 912.
[Vol. 26
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whom he is dealing. '34 The average investor would probably per-
ceive this unfairness as a powerful incentive not to invest in a
market under the control of insiders.3 5
Of the European nations, only France and the United Kingdom
have legislation concerning the use of insider information. And,
even in these two exceptions to the general no-legislation policy,
commentators have expressed opinions that the laws go unen-
forced to the point where tipping 8  is "virtually legal' 38 in the
United Kingdom39 and "even a social duty" in France."
In claiming jurisdiction over cases under lOb-5, the United
States takes the rather simplistic approach that its statutes regu-
lating insider trading are based on preventing fraudulent activi-
ties. All legal systems contain anti-fraud provisions. Therefore, no
regulatory conflict exists in the imposition of the United States'
regulations and definitions of fraud on the foreign regulatory sys-
tems. 1 In reality, each sovereign nation defines fraudulent activity
in accord with its own moral and ethical precepts. Conduct de-
fined as fraudulent (such as insider trading) in the United States,
may be encouraged in another country, such as France, which
views tipping as a social duty.
IV. FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS' INTEREST IN CONTROLLING
DISCLOSURE
This insensitivity to the goals of foreign regulatory systems,
while claiming jurisdiction, is partially responsible for a policy
34. Id.
35. Market analysts fear that the exposure of insider traders may cause the average
investor to perceive the markets as under the control of a conspiracy of insiders. This per-
ception would lead to a "crisis of confidence", in which investors would refuse to invest in
such a controlled market. See Ivan Boesky, supra note 3, at 51.
36. See Crukshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345, 346
(1986).
37. Tipping is the knowing disclosure of material, nonpublic information which the
tippee then trades on, knowing that the information was given to him in breach of an
insider's fiduciary duty to his corporation.
38. See Loss, supra note 4, at 236.
39. This attitude may be changing in the wake of the Boesky scandal, which crossed
the Atlantic to reveal massive insider trading in the Guiness brewery takeover.
40. See Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporate Law and Securities
Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 762 (1982).
41. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (extraterritorial enforcement of
anti-fraud provisions will cause favorable reciprocal responses by other nations), cert. de-
nied sub nom., Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 421 U.S. 938 (1977); Bersch v. Drexel,
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1977) (same) cert. denied sub nom., Bersch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1918 (1975); see also Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511
F. Supp. 582, 587 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (rejecting need for evaluation of interests of other
nations on grounds that every "civilized nation doubtless has [this rule against fraud] as
part of its legal system") rev'd on other grounds, 712 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1982); Comment,
The Transnational Reach of lOb-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1399 (1973).
1989]
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among foreign nations of refusing to disclose documents and infor-
mation.42 Foreign nations perceive the United States' aggressive
claims of jurisdiction as undermining their own sovereign author-
ity, and, in response, have enacted or are proposing legislation
that would automatically serve as a barrier to any discovery at-
tempted within the foreign state. The overly broad disclosure 3
granted in United States courts and the subsequent disclosure of
private, confidential business records may damage a corporation
whose competitors are not in a position where the forced disclos-
ure of similar records is required. Blocking legislation usually con-
ditions the production of information in compliance with the judi-
cial process of the foreign state. As the foreign state may and
usually does have stricter discovery requirements and will not vio-
late secrecy provisions, the discovery allowed is far less than that
to which a United States litigant would have access under United
States discovery procedures.
A. Example44
Using the French legislation as an example, a request for pre-
trial discovery would proceed in the following fashion. First, juris-
diction must be clear or have been claimed by a United States
court. The French blocking statute makes disclosure not made in
accord with the "Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters" 45 a criminal offense. However,
when France became a signatory to the Hague Convention in
1974, it took an Article 2346 reservation (which allows a nation to
refuse to execute pretrial discovery). As almost all discovery in
42. See generally Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Transnational Securities
Fraud: A Suggested Roadmap to the New Standard of Reasonableness, 71 CORNELL LA
REV. 919 (1986) [hereinafter Suggested Roadmap].
43. See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., (1978) 1 All E. R. 434
(English court refused to give effect to language in a discovery order requesting any memo-
randum, correspondence, or other document relevant to the described document, and la-
belled the request a fishing trip); Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, [1985] 1 W.C.R. 33
(House of Lords) (established two requirements for discovery orders; 1. the document must
be described with particularity, 2. the party seeking the document must establish its exis-
tence and that the party from which the document is being sought has possession).
44. See Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking Legislation" A Guide to Securing
Disclosure from Non-resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAw. 61 (1983)
[hereinafter Batista].
45. The test of the (Hague) Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. no. 7444 (1972) appears in 7
MARTI NDALE-HuBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4509 (1980), with a listing of signatory nations
and their reservations.
46. "A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, de-
clare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents as known in Common Law Countries." Id. at art. 23.
[Vol. 26
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United States litigation is pretrial,47 the unlucky litigant is
"blocked" from obtaining all the documents that he may consider
necessary for the furthering of his case.48 An examination of the
history of the French legislation clearly reveals that the primary
purpose of the legislation was "the protection of French compa-
nies against abusive investigation by foreign authorities."4
The above examples of secrecy provisions and disclosure block-
ing legislation clarify the consequences of aggressive claims of ju-
risdiction. The validity of the United States claim to jurisdiction is
clearly doubted by foreign jurisdictions. To protect its businesses
and ensure compliance with its substantive and procedural laws,
foreign nations are requiring that discovery requests be filtered
through the foreign judicial system. The foreign states perceive an
overly aggressive "grasping" of jurisdiction by United States
courts and have responded in such a way as to make it impossible
for the United States to ignore the national interests of the foreign
nation.
This perception is confirmed by an examination of the recent
expansion in claiming subject matter jurisdiction over securities
fraud cases. The United States courts have claimed jurisdiction
over cases in which the transactions have had no effects in the
United States or on the United States markets. Jurisdiction is
based, in some cases, on an act as insignificant as a phone call.
V. UNITED STATES CLAIMING JURISDICTION OVER 10B-5 CASES
As a first step in cases with foreign aspects,50 a court must
claim jurisdiction over a case. Originally, courts focused on two
tests for jurisdiction: 1) fraudulent conduct 51 which takes place
within the United States52 and 2) adverse effects53 within the
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. For further discussion of Rule 37, see generally 8 WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284.
48. See Graco v. Kremlin, 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. I11. 1984); Club Mediterranee,
S.A. v. Dorin, 465 U.S. 1019 (1984).
49. Cited in Batista, supra note 37, at 66.
50. For the purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction over securities fraud
actions that include a foreign transaction, a foreign transaction is one that involves one or
more of the following: foreign investors, foreign sellers and defendants, foreign securities,
and negotiations and sales occurring outside the United States.
51. For a definition of conduct for the purposes of foreign relations law see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT].
52. Schoembaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) rev'd on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom, Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395
U.S. 906 (1969); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-
36 (2d Cir. 1972). Subsequent analyses point to the holding in Schoembaum which was
based on the analysis of the Restatement. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d
974 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied sub nom, Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018
19891
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United States. 4 The first cases looked at both conduct and effects.
In Schoembaum v. Firstbrook,5 5 the court commented that "we
think it tips the scales in favor of applicability when substantial
misrepresentations were made in the United States.""6 A later
court interpreted this language as requiring both conduct and ef-
fects.57 The conduct test evolved requirements which distinguish
the conduct by the nature of the act.58 However, some jurisdic-
tions have expanded their claims to jurisdiction by holding that
fraudulent conduct within the United States is sufficient grounds,
in and of itself, to grant jurisdiction." The importance of requir-
ing only fraudulent conduct became clearer when further develop-
ments set the threshold level of required activity 0 necessary for
(1975); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); IIT, Int'l Inv. Trust v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. For a definition of effects for the purposes of foreign relation law, see RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 51, at § 18.
54. Schoembaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) rev'd on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395
U.S. 906 (1969); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-
36 (2d Cir. 1972); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. ) cert. denied
sub nom., Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); IIT, Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917
(2d Cir. 1980).
55. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).56. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1336, 1339 (2d Cir.
1972).
57. Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
58. Leasco v. Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-36 (2d Cir.
1972); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction will
not be found in "cases where the United States activities are merely preparatory or take
the form of culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad")
cert. denied sub nom., Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); lIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (distinguished the facts from those in
Bersch and found jurisdiction over fraudulent acts that were more than merely
preparatory).
59. lIT, Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917-18 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejected
the need to fulfill the effects test from Schoembaum, but suggested that jurisdiction might
be found upon further finding of conduct based on Bersch and Vencap and remanded to
make further findings); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977) (quotes Vencap in
rejecting the effects test and holds that jurisdiction may be found on conduct alone) cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 n.4 (1978) (juris-
diction was established through an analysis of conduct without going further to analyze
whether adverse effects were present or necessary); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 417 (8th Cir. 1979) ("jurisdiction may be estab-
lished [by fulfilling the] requirements of either not both, the conduct or effects test");
Grumenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
For an analysis of the conduct test that favors the expanded jurisdiction provided by
holding that fraudulent conduct alone is sufficient ground for jurisdiction see generally
Comment, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: The Ex-
panding Application of the Conduct Test, 59 N.D.L.R. 471 (1984).
60. In claiming jurisdiction the court should pay close and particular attention to the
concrete facts of each case. Venture Fund (International) N.V. v. Willkie Farr & Gal-
lagher, 418 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 414.
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jurisdiction at a mere phone call.6"
In 1977, a third circuit court based jurisdiction on the use of
the United States mail system, the operation in part from a corpo-
rate office in the United States, and the signing of the final con-
tract in the United States.62 In 1979, a court in the eighth circuit
found jurisdiction where an attorney in the United States was in-
volved in the closing of the sale of a corporation and the related
travel to the attorney's office led to an inference of use of United
States telephones and mails.63 In 1980, the second circuit based
jurisdiction on the American nationality of the issuer and the exe-
cution of the transaction in the United States.64 However, in 1981,
the ninth circuit rejected the more liberal eighth circuit approach
and declined to find jurisdiction over a case involving the execu-
tion of a contract for the sale of stocks in the office of an Ameri-
can attorney, where the misrepresentations that had led to the sale
were repeated but not confirmed,65 and related travel to the attor-
ney's office was imputed by the representative's presence in the
United States. 6 Although the court did not claim jurisdiction, it
indicated that its analysis67 and holding68 were in accord with the
second circuit line of cases.
Even though the ninth circuit retreated from the more liberal
approach of the eighth circuit, a chronological analysis of the con-
trolling cases illustrates a change to sole reliance on the conduct
test and a clear decrease in the amount of fraudulent activity nec-
essary to meet the test and claim jurisdiction in the United States.
VI. BEYOND JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
Once jurisdiction69 has been established, the court may require
information regarding documents held in a foreign jurisdiction. In
61. Section lOb-5 prohibits the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce for
fraudulent purposes. The courts have expanded upon this until a telephone call originating
in or coming into the United States is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. The courts have
also ruled that a person's presence inside the United States is also sufficient to prove that
an instrument of interstate commerce has been used in order for the person to be traveling
in the United States.
62. Kasser, 548 F.2d at I11.
63. Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
412-13 (8th Cir. 1979) ("a substantially foreign transaction, little if any domestic impact,
and domestic conduct which consisted for the most part of use of the mail and telephones."
Id. at 421).
64. IIT, Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
66. Id. at 588 n.6.
67. Id. at 587 ("Second Circuit reiterated its case by case approach ... emphasiz-
ing that neither the conduct nor the effects test was necessarily dispositive").
68. Id. at 588.
69. The courts claimed in personam jurisdiction in the cases examined in this section
19891
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SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana,0 the bank, BSI, refused to
reveal the identities of its account holders. These account holders
had ordered the purchase of stocks and stock options in the St. Joe
Minerals Corp. The following day, a cash tender offer caused the
price of the stock to go from $30 to $45. The subsequent transac-
tions netted an overnight profit of over $2 million. Judge Pollack
of the second circuit granted the SEC's motion to compel discov-
ery under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court's opinion rested on an analysis of Societe Interna-
tional Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers,71 and current law in the second circuit. According to the
BSI court, "Societe holds that the good faith of the party resisting
discovery is a key factor in the decision whether to impose sanc-
tions when foreign law prohibits the requested disclosure."
Early second circuit cases judged foreign law prohibitions as an
absolute bar to ordering inspection or production of documents. 2
Judge Pollack distinguished these cases as concerning nonparty
witnesses. a Yet he failed to explain why parties to suit should
have to violate the foreign law, while nonparty witnesses could
claim an exemption from the production of documents.
Then Judge Pollack analyzed two recent second circuit cases74
in which he had found jurisdiction. His opinions had been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, which had used an analysis of Sections
3975 and 4076 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations.
Section 39(1) specifically states that foreign laws prohibiting
disclosure do not present an absolute bar to ordering disclosure.
Section 40 presents several factors which are used to decide which
nation has the controlling interest in (and therefore, jurisdiction
over) the matter. Judge Pollack examined the other circuits and
of the paper.
70. 92 F.R.D. I11, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (In this case, the bank (BSI) itself oper-
ated in New York through a subsidiary corporation) (hereinafter BSI).
71. 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (a Swiss holding company was suing for the return of prop-
erty seized by the Alien Property Custodian Act during World War II).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. In re First Nat'l City Bank, 285 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afid, United
States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (held Citibank in con-
tempt and imposed sanctions for refusal to comply with a subpoena duces tecum in a grand
jury investigation into anti-trust violation occurring in the United States. The court held
that foreign law did not prohibit disclosure and that Citibank had not shown good faith in
its attempts to comply); Trade Development Bank v. Continental Insurance Company, Co.,
71 Civ. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) affid, 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972) (Court of Appeals alluded to
the factors of Restatement § 40).
75. City Bank 396 F.2d at 901-02; Trade Bank does not specifically mention Re-
statement § 39; however, § 39 must apply before the balancing tests found in § 40 are
used.
76. City Bank, 396 F.2d at 902-905; Trade Bank, 469 F.2d at 41.
[Vol. 26
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district courts that had used the balancing approach and held that
the second circuit would use the factors found in section 40 to
balance competing national interests.
Courts since BSI have purported to apply the balancing test 77 to
order enforcement of summons through the application of sanc-
tions in several tax evasion cases.1 8
VII. UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN CLAIMING JURISDICTION
The Continental Grain court commented that "taking jurisdic-
tion [was] largely a policy decision."' 9 The policy interests of the
United States in claiming jurisdiction over cases involving the ex-
traterritorial application of the provisions of Rule 1Ob-5, have
been enumerated in several cases."s The Leasco court examined
the legislative intent behind 1Ob-5 to decide if Congress meant
lOb-5 to have an extraterritorial application." In the absence of
any expression of legislative intent, the Leasco court found that it
simply could not "perceive any reason why [Congress] should
have wished to limit the protection [of 10b-5]" 2 to securities of
American issuers" or to securities traded on American ex-
changes.84 The Kasser court followed and expanded upon the
Leasco court's rationale when it held that "to deny such jurisdic-
tion may embolden those who wish to defraud. . . .We are reluc-
tant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United
States to become a 'Barbary Coast' as it were, harboring interna-
tional securities 'pirates.' "85
Imputing a legislative intent through an absence of either dis-
77. BSI, 92 F.R.D. 111, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
78. United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984) cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S. Ct 778 (1985); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi-
cago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 52 A. F.T.R. 2d
83-5752 (D.C. Cal. 1983); In re Grand Jury Subpoena directed to Marc Rich & Co., A.G.,
707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
79. 592 F.2d at 421.
80. Leasco v. Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-36 (2d Cir.
1972). Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) cert. denied sub nom.,
Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F. 2d
1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); IIT, Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir.
1980); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977);
United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (1978); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v.
Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); Grumenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F.
Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
81. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334.
82. Id. at 1336.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977).
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cussion of other information or congressional intent is not a sound
principle of construction. Legislative intent must either be fairly
implied from or explicitly found within the statute or in the stat-
ute's history. The court in both Leasco and Kasser recognized that
Congress made no mention of whether 1Ob-5 was meant to be ap-
plied on an extraterritorial basis. The intent of the Leasco and
Kasser courts to extend the protection of 1Ob-5 by claiming juris-
diction over predominantly foreign cases may be laudable. How-
ever, strong policy reasons exist that argue for limiting the juris-
diction accorded by Rule lOb-5.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. The purpose of the Act is "to ensure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets."8 Clearly, the mar-
kets to be protected were the United States markets. Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court traditionally has been reluctant
to impose its jurisdiction over cases in which the foreign elements
predominate, under the doctrine of separation of powers. Foreign
relations is a function of the executive branch of the government.
Neither the court nor the Congress may grant jurisdiction over a
foreign matter.
The finding of jurisdiction may be construed by a foreign state
as an invasion of its sovereign right to rule its own capital mar-
kets. Therefore, the courts should be especially careful to prevent
unwarranted intrusion into the jurisdiction of another legislative
and judicial system. This argument is strengthened by a parallel
development in antitrust law in which the courts have limited
their jurisdiction to cases in which an effect on a United States
market has been established.
The Kasser court also explained that prosecuting those who at-
tempted to bypass prosecution by miking jurisdictions would 'en-
courage other nations to take appropriate steps against parties
who seek to perpetrate fraud. . . .,8 This policy argument has
an uncomfortable ring of 'Big Brother-ism' to it; an implication
that foreign nations are quick to pick up on. Some foreign states
feel strongly that the United States is attempting to impose its
judgments and definitions of criminality in the area of securities
on foreign securities markets. 8
86. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
87. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.
88. See supra note 9.
[Vol. 26
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VIII. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL VIEWS ON EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION
Treaties concerning the exchange of information or documents
require the crime being investigated or prosecuted to be a crime
under the laws of both states."9 As most European nations have no
legislation or common law that makes the use of inside informa-
tion illegal, disclosure would not be required by treaty, even
though the exchange of information in other criminal matters may
be well established.90 In a situation where no laws ban disclosure
and treaties require it, the disclosure of information becomes an
act of comity between nations, which in turn is based on a recog-
nition of jurisdiction over the parties and transactions involved.
Such an act of comity is based on respect for the interests, poli-
cies, and laws of both nations in evaluating what has become a
jurisdictional conflict.
IX. UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE 9 '
Policy interests similar to those discussed in Kasser and Leasco
have been articulated as justifying disclosure orders and the appli-
cation of sanctions92 to entities that do not comply with the dis-
closure orders. The BSI court intended to "ensure the integrity of
the [United States] financial markets." Other courts have held
that a grand jury investigation concerning the enforcement of the
United States tax laws will outweigh a foreign state's interest in
89. A treaty that concerns the release of information follows the requirements of an
extradition treaty. The state is literally extraditing the information. The requirement of
double criminality (the crime must be a crime in both nations) evolved in international law
and may be imputed as a requirement of an extradition treaty even though not specifically
stated in the treaty. See generally 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 15, at ch.
8-9.
90. For a discussion of how a treaty may be utilized based on the Treaty on Mutual
Assistance, supra note 11, see Tigar & Doyle, International Exchange of Information in
Criminal Cases, MICH. Y.B. INT'L. LEGAL STUDIES 61, 63-71 (1983). For a general discus-
sion of the provisions usually found in such treaties see Ellis & Pisani, United States Trea-
ties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L. LAW.
189 (1985).
91. The following cases are not all in areas covered by lOb-5 or securities exchange
regulation. They all do involve the extraterritorial application of United States disclosure
procedure.
92. Blocking statutes are only relevant in decisions to invoke sanction on non-comply-
ing parties. Compare In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 563 F.2d
992 (10th Cir. 1977) and Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (non-production of documents excused) with Ohio v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978) (sanctions imposed for failure to produce documents)
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1975). Both a direct conflict with the blocking or secrecy laws
and a good faith effort to obtain a waiver to the blocking or secrecy laws must be present to
excuse failure to comply and to avoid sanctions. See also BSI, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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enforcing its secrecy laws.
The courts steadfastly refuse to realize that their cavalier dis-
missal of the secrecy provisions and blocking laws of foreign coun-
tries as being of less importance than the enforcement of a United
States interest, no matter how attenuated, is not really in the best
interests of cooperation and comity between judicial systems.
When a court has in personam jurisdiction over a branch of a
bank or corporation, it may impose sanctions to compel discovery.
However, when the court claims subject matter jurisdiction, it is
powerless to enforce either sanctions or its judgment without the
help of the foreign judicial system. In response, the foreign state
may choose to enact or reinforce legal impediments to what it per-
ceives as an invasion of its sovereign immunity. An alternative
exists.
A. Example
In SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of Santa Fe Stock,93
the court urged the Securities and Exchange Commission to util-
ize the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters9 4 as an
alternative to imposing sanctions, in order to compel compliance
with a discovery order.95 Even though the exchange of information
in criminal matters was well-established,96 the Swiss bankers
could not release the necessary information of documents without
violating the secrecy laws, because insider trading was not prohib-
ited by Swiss law.97
Negotiations between the SEC and the Swiss government and
bankers resolved the matter by arriving at a special agreement
specifically concerning insider trading.98 The agreement stipulated
93. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call Options
for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH)] 98,323 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter Santa Fe].
94. Treaty on Mutual Assistance, supra note 11.
95. Santa Fe, supra note 93.
96. Santa Fe, supra note 93.
97. The court tried to fit insider trading under some of the other criminal statutes
concerning the use and misuse of information, but had no success. Santa Fe, supra note 93.
For a discussion of insider trading as a use or misuse of confidential information, see gener-
ally Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Produc-
tion of Information, 19 Sup. CT. REv. 309 (suggests a new category for problems concern-
ing the use of, the misuse of, and the formation of property rights in confidential
information).
98. Memorandum of Understanding, Switzerland-United States. The Swiss-United
States negotiations and the MOU are discussed in Green, U.S., Switzerland Agree to Pros-
ecute Inside Traders, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1982, at 12. The MOU is reprinted id at 17-
19. See also Navickas, Swiss Banks and Insider Trading in the United States, 2 INT'L TAX
Bus. LAW. 159 (1984); Note, The Effect of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement on Swiss Banking
Secrecy and Insider Trading, 15 LAW AND POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 565 (1983).
[Vol. 26
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that the SEC would have access to the Swiss judicial system,
would use Swiss disclosure procedures, and would be limited by
Swiss judicial discretion. This case proves that the two systems
can work together to reach a common goal, while recognizing that
the secrecy and blocking laws are not in place to protect criminals.
B. Suggestions Toward a Solution
One approach would be to legislate jurisdiction under the guise
of foreign policy.9 The Draft Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law is an example. The Draft Restatement re-defines the jurisdic-
tion of United States courts along the lines of "minimum con-
tacts" which the United States developed in previous lOb-5 cases.
Formalizing this expanded jurisdiction could further aggravate
foreign states and possibly provoke an international round of "ju-
risdiction grabbing."
A suggestion that Congress clarify the jurisdiction of 1Ob-5 by
promulgating a clear set of statutory rules would be perilously
close to allowing Congress to make what is, in essence, foreign
policy. One possible way of getting around this problem would be
to place the focus of the statutory scheme on limiting trading on
American securities markets to those entities that agree that the
act of trading will serve as a waiver of the protection offered by
the foreign jurisdiction. 100 This waiver by conduct approach was
originally a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act.' 10 It was removed
because of fear of limiting foreign involvement and investment,
and the subsequent loss of profits.'0 2 SEC proposal of an amend-
ment to Rule 17a-3(a)(9) was also cancelled because of similar
negative responses.' 0 3 Yet even if the waiver by conduct is legiti-
mized by amendment or case law, it would still only affect the
problems created by the secrecy provisions.
C. Suggestions for Negotiations
The best approach to regulating insider trading would be to set
a world standard that would apply to all capital markets involved
99. Compare Robinson, Compelling Discovery and Evidence in International Liti-
gation, 18 INT'L LAW. 533 (1984) (a discussion that favors the current Restatement's bal-
ancing of interests found in § 40) with Note, Suggested Roadmap, supra note 42, (a dis-
cussion that favors the Draft Restatement, which follows the expanded jurisdiction).
100. See generally Note, The SEC's Waiver by Conduct Proposal: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 71 VA. L. REV. 1411 (1985); Fedders, Policing Internationalized Capital Markets:
Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. (1984) [hereinafter Fedders].
101. S. 3678, § 401, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 32626-27 (1970).
102. 116 Cong. Rec. 32630-33 (1970) (statement of Senator Bennet).
103. See Note, Foreign Bank Secrecy and the Evasion of United States Securities
Laws, 9 N.Y.U.J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 417, 446-49 (1977).
1989]
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in securities trading.Y4 The varying standards in the differing
markets make a common standard difficult to envision. One ap-
proach would be to establish a world standard based on the stan-
dards common to all the regulatory systems: a minimal approach
that would allow free investigatory and prosecutorial access to in-
formation when one of the common standards had been violated.
The process of working out a common standard would also set up
common, basic definitions "05 that would be helpful in subsequent
negotiations. The necessary articulation of purposes, policies, defi-
nitions, and individual standards of differing jurisdictions would
help to indicate other areas of agreement between individual
states that might lead to further accords in specified areas beyond
the minimal standards. Nation-by-nation agreements based on the
Swiss-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding would be limited in
their application to the nations which agree to them.
As a first step 0 6 towards this type of international regulatory
104. See Securities Exchange Act Releases No. 65168, 50 Fed. Reg. 9,261 (Feb. 28,
1985); No. 21958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302 (April 18, 1985); 22190, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302
(June 28, 1985).
105. This would be particularly appropriate in the area of insider trading, as the
United States has no statutory definition and the judicially created doctrine is not clear.
See generally Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force
on Regulation of Insider Trading: Part I Regulation under the Antifraud Provision of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223 (1985) (concludes that Congress
should address specifically the use of information rather than to allow the rules to develop
on a case-by-case basis.)
106. The SEC has taken a first step in recognizing the validity of each nation's con-
cerns in regulating its own markets in the area of registered securities. In Exchange Act
Release No. 33-4708 (July 9, 1964) 29 FR 9828, the SEC took the position that the regis-
tration requirements under Section 5 should not be imposed on offerings with only inciden-
tal jurisdictional contacts. Under Release 4708 and the subsequent no-action letters issued
by the SEC, United States corporations would be allowed to forego the registration re-
quirements if all the securities came to rest abroad or in the hands of foreign nationals.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken a step in this direction in three
recent releases which propose a territorial approach to the registration requirements for
offshore offerings. See "Regulation S," Securities Act Release No. 6779, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Par. 84,242 (June 10, 1988); (The proposal of
a 'safe harbor' for offshore offerings); "Proposed Rule 144A", Securities Act Release No.
6806, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) Par. 84,335 (Oct. 25, 1988) (The rule would
permit securities distributed abroad to be resold to institutions in the United States under
specified circumstances); the third release would concern mutual recognition of prospec-
tuses and certain aspects of takeover regulation with certain Canadian securities authori-
ties. See generally Coogan, SEC Proposes Safe Harbor for Offshore Offers, 9 THE Busi-
NESS LAWYER UPDATE 1 (January/February 1989).
REGULATION S
Proposed Regulation S consists of six proposed Rules. Rule 901(a) is a general statement
of the intent to exempt offers and sales that occur outside the United States. See Release
6779, at 89, 130.
Rule 901 (b) provides the factors to analyze whether the transaction is outside the United
States. Id. The first factor requires that each element of the transaction must take place or
be performed entirely outside of the United States. See Release 6779, at 89,131. If offers
or even advertisements are made within the United States by telephone, the mail, in per-
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scheme, the current "minimum contacts" standard for claiming
subject matter jurisdiction currently evolving in some district
courts needs to be re-evaluated. When jurisdictions are in conflict,
especially on an international level, a more demanding set of crite-
ria should be used.
A detrimental effect on American securities markets would be
adequate for jurisdictional purposes, as would in personam juris-
diction. These criteria would adequately serve the American inter-
est in protecting its markets and to protect United States inves-
son, or in any other manner, the exemption would not apply. Id. The location of the buyer
when the buy order originates and the place of execution, payment and delivery will also be
considered. Id.
The "directed selling efforts" discussed in 901(b)(2) would be directed to activities un-
dertaken by the issuer or any sellers (which term would include the distributer and its
affiliates or agents) to induce buyers to buy. Id. Even advertisements which specifically
stated that this was an offshore offer would be included.
Rule 901(b)(3) provides the factors to determine whether the securities would come to
rest outside of the United States. Id. at 89.123.
Rule 901(b)(4) concerns the justified expectations of the parties concerning the applica-
bility of the United States registration requirements. Id.
SAFE HARBORS UNDER REGULATION S
Fulfilling the general requirements would protect an offshore offering from the registra-
tion requirements even if the offering does not fit specifically within one of the three safe
harbors. Proposed Rules 903-906 describe two non-exclusive safe harbors for extraterrito-
rial sales and resales of securities. Id. at 89,133.
The first category provides a safe harbor for non-reporting foreign issuers with no sub-
stantial United States market interest. The major problem associated with this exemption
would be for those issuers that could not establish the volume of off-exchange United
States trading in their securities.
The second category concerns reporting United States and foreign issuers. These issuers
gain several advantages over the requirements developed under Release 4708. The 90-day
lock-up begins with the closing of the offering. [Under Release 4708, the 90 day period
began at the completion of the distribution which could be difficult to accurately calculate.]
The 90 day requirement would be the same for both debt and equity securities [the prior
requirement for equity securities was 1 year]. However, recommendations to change the 90
day period to 40 days to correspond with Section 4(3) are being considered. Release 4708
used the terms "American investors," "American nationals," and "foreign nationals" but
did not define the terms. The more common phrase "U.S. person" devolved from later no-
action letters concerning the applicability of Release 4708 on specific offers. The term
"U.S. person" includes citizens and residents of the United States as well as organizations
formed under the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof. See
Goldman, Sachs & Co., (Oct. 3, 1985); Executive Management Inc. (Oct 28, 1983). Busi-
nesses regulated locally, such as foreign branches of United States banks and insurance
companies, were not considered U.S. persons. See Foreign Agencies and Branches of
United States Banks and Insurance Companies, (Feb. 25, 1988); Dresser Industries Ca-
nada, Ltd. (Oct. 31, 1977); Vizcaya International N.. (Apr. 4, 1973); First Interstate
Bancorp (Mar. 15, 1985).
Regulation S uses the term "U.S. person." Under Regulation S, United States citizens
residing abroad, agencies or branches of United States corporations subject to substantive
regulation in the foreign jurisdiction, or agencies or branches that were not established to
invest unregistered securities would not be included under the buyer prohibition. Regula-
tion S indicates that these would be covered, but the staff indicates that they may be
exempt under the final version.
The safe harbor may still be available to other issuers if they satisfy the conditions set
out in Rule 901 and the stringent requirements developed under Release 4708.
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tors. However, conduct sufficient to justify jurisdiction should go
past the minimal contacts which the eighth circuit has determined
are adequate.
In cases requiring disclosures, the disclosure orders should be
tailored to reveal only the information necessary to the investiga-
tion or prosecution. Foreign jurisdictions object to the overly
broad disclosure requirements under the United States system. A
voluntarily tailored request show's a good faith effort to respect
foreign procedure and may encourage a foreign judicial system to
recognize that the intrusion into the foreign jurisdiction has been
deliberately minimized.
A comparison between the steps set out in the Swiss-United
States Memorandum of Understanding and the French example
shows a similar pattern of utilizing the foreign judicial system.
This avenue of cooperative effort should not be ignored under the
assumption that foreign courts will automatically ignore or reject
the request.
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